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Abstract 
Prior to the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) many African States held a unified and 
seemingly hostile position towards the UNDRIP exemplified by the 
concerns outlined in African Group’s Draft Aide Memoire. In order to 
gain a better understanding of the protections offered to indigenous 
peoples on the African continent, it is necessary to examine the 
concerns raised in the aforementioned Draft Aide Memoire and 
highlight how these concerns have been addressed at the regional level, 
effectively changing how the human rights norms contained within the 
UNDRIP are seen, understood and interpreted in the African context. 
The purpose of this Article is to do just that: examine in particular how 
the issue of defining indigenous peoples has been tackled on the 
African continent; how the right to self-determination has unfolded for 
indigenous peoples in Africa; and, how indigenous peoples’ right to 
free, prior and informed consent has been interpreted at the regional 
level. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After over two decades of negotiations, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) on 13 September 2007, with 143 States voting in favour, 4 States 
opposing, 11 States abstaining and 34 States noted as absent.1 While this has rightly 
been seen as a momentous achievement for indigenous peoples worldwide, and for 
international law more generally, a closer examination of the voting record, where 
three African countries abstained from the final vote and another 15 African countries 
were absent, hints at a larger story: one concerning Africa’s reaction to the UNDRIP 
and the human rights norms contained within the Declaration.2 
Prior to the adoption of the UNDRIP, the text had been debated at length by the 
United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, State representatives and 
indigenous communities with a negotiated version being adopted by the Human 
Rights Council in June 2006.3 Throughout this process most African States did not 
take any meaningful part in the debates, undoubtedly for a variety of reasons, all of 
which have been addressed elsewhere. 4 Importantly, however, once the UNDRIP 
arrived in the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Namibia, on 
behalf of a group of African States and governments (African Group), called for a 
deferment on consideration and action on the proposed Declaration, with no African 
                                                 
1 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295, adopted 
on 13 September 2007. See also International Law Association, Rights of Indigenous Peoples – Interim 
Report (2010), available at: <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024> (last accessed 
1 April 2016). 
2 D. Newman, Africa and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in S. 
Dersso (ed),  Perspective on the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Africa, Pretoria 
University of Law Press (2010) 141-155, at 142. 
3 A. K. Barume, Responding to the Concerns of the African States, in C. Charters and R. Stavenhagen 
(eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (2009) 170-183, at 172. 
4 See N. Kipuri, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the African Context, in C 
Charters and R Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (2009) 252-263. 
3 
State voting against Namibia’s amendment. 5  On 9 November 2006, the African 
Group published their concerns in a document entitled Draft Aide Memoire – United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples6 (Draft Aide Memoire), and 
their concerns can be summarised as follows. In particular African States 
 
1. wanted a formal definition of indigenous peoples in order to identify the rights holders 
and also to minimise inter-ethnic tensions and instability; 
2. objected to indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as included in the UNDRIP 
because it could negatively impact political stability, and could confer the right to 
secede and thus threatening territorial integrity; 
3. feared that by recognising the right of indigenous peoples to political, social and 
cultural institutions, the UNDRIP contradicted several constitutions that promote 
unified States; 
4. feared that by accepting the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation in 
accordance with traditions and customs of the nation or community meant that people 
could change their nationalities freely, resulting in political instability;  
5. believed that the right of indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent meant 
that indigenous communities could veto national legislation;  
6. believed that recognising the rights of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and 
natural resources they traditionally owned, occupied or acquired was legally 
unworkable and in breach of States’ rights over land and natural resources; and,  
7. objected to the provisions of the UNDRIP pertaining to the right of indigenous 
peoples to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and 
other constructive arrangements concluded with States as treaties were exclusively a 
State matter.7 
 
As one can see, at the time of the Draft Aide Memoire, many African States held a 
unified, and seemingly hostile position towards the UNDRIP. However, since then 
there have been many developments at the African level, which has led to a change in 
how the human rights norms contained within the UNDRIP are seen, understood and 
interpreted in the African context. In order to gain a better understanding of the 
protections offered to indigenous peoples on the African continent, it is necessary to 
examine the concerns raised in the Draft Aide Memoire and highlight how these 
                                                 
5 United Nations General Assembly, 61st Session, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/61/L.57/Rev. 1, 28 November 
2006, at para. 2. See also W. van Genugten, Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African 
Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal Systems, 104  American Journal of 
International Law (2010) 29-65, at 35. 
6  African Group, Draft Aide Memoire – United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 9 November 2006 <http://www.ipacc.org.za/uploads/docs/Africanaidememoire.pdf> 
(accessed on 1 February 2014). 
7 A. K. Barume, supra note 3 at 171-172. 
4 
concerns have been addressed at the regional level. The purpose of this chapter is to 
do just that, examine in particular how the issue of defining indigenous peoples has 
been tackled on the African continent, how the right to self-determination has 
unfolded for indigenous peoples in Africa, and how indigenous peoples’ right to free, 
prior and informed consent has been interpreted at the regional level. 
 
II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN AFRICA: A CONTESTED CONCEPT 
A. A brief overview 
There is no doubt that the term ‘indigenous peoples’ is an evolving concept. 
As Albert Barume noted in Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa: “to reach its 
current understanding in international law, the meaning of the term ‘indigenous’ 
seems to have evolved through several distinct phases.”8 During the colonial era, the 
term ‘indigenous’ was applied to all peoples found in colonised territories, regardless 
of where they were born or their migration patterns, descendants of those who 
occupied a given territory that was invaded, conquered and colonised by white 
colonial powers.9 Following this, different meanings alluding to ‘indigenous peoples’ 
emerged from the aftermath of World War II, the subsequent decolonisation process 
and the changing attitudes towards the fate or current situation of colonised 
populations. 10  This is evidenced through the evolution of definitions attached to 
indigenous peoples from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 
107 of 195711, to ILO Convention No. 169 of 198912, to the widely used definition 
                                                 
8  A. K. Barume, Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa, International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs (2010), at 20. 
9  ibid at 21. See also S. Saugestad, Contested Images: Indigenous Peoples in Africa (1999) 2 
Indigenous Affairs (1999) 6-9, at 7. 
10 ibid. 
11 ILO, Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and 
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, adopted on 26 June 1957 and entered into force on 
2 June 1959, 328 U.N.T.S. 247. Art. 1  defines indigenous peoples as follows: 
1. This Convention applies to-- 
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emanating from the José Martinez Cobo study on the problem of discrimination 
against indigenous peoples, which was completed in 1986.13 
However, the foci of the above mentioned definitions are the elements of 
‘historical continuity’, ‘pre-invasion’ and ‘pre-colonial’; in other words, first peoples 
                                                                                                                                            
(a) members of tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries whose social and 
economic conditions are at a less advanced stage than the stage reached by the other sections 
of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own 
customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; 
(b) members of tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries which are regarded as 
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation and 
which, irrespective of their legal status, live more in conformity with the social, economic and 
cultural institutions of that time than with the institutions of the nation to which they belong. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the term semi-tribal includes groups and persons who, although 
they are in the process of losing their tribal characteristics, are not yet integrated into the national 
community. 
12 ILO, Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted 
27 June 1989, entered into force on 5 September 1991, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383. Art. 1 offers the following 
definition: 
1. This Convention applies to: 
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions 
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated 
wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; 
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent 
from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the 
country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, 
economic, cultural and political institutions. 
2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for 
determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply. 
13  J. M. Cobo, Report of the Special Rapporteur to the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities – Study on the Problem of Discrimination against 
Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1986/Add. 4 (1986) at paras. 379-380: 
 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity 
with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories or 
parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own 
cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. 
 
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into 
the present of one or more of the following factors: 
a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them 
b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands 
c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal 
system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.) 
d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of 
communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal 
language) 
e) Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world 
f) Other relevant factors. 
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who were dislocated from their traditional way of life through colonial conquest, mass 
murder, dispossession and displacement.14 When it came to Africa, this presented an 
obstacle, as clearly the situation in most parts of the continent was very different, with 
very few groups being able to claim status as ‘first peoples’.15 As the Assembly of the 
African Union affirmed in January 2007: “…the vast majority of the peoples of Africa 
are indigenous to the African Continent.”16 As questions concerning the conceptual 
applicability of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ in Africa arose, it became obvious that 
there was a need to refocus the definition from an African perspective.17  
Work in this area was already underway, as the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR or African Commission) established the 
African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities (African Working Group) in 2000, with a mandate to: 
“examine the concept of indigenous people and communities in Africa; study the 
implications of the African Charter on Human Rights on the well being of indigenous 
communities; consider appropriate recommendations for the monitoring and 
protection of the rights of indigenous communities; and, submit a report to the 
African Commission.”18 Linked to the future approach to be taken with regards to 
indigenous peoples in Africa was the emotive debates surrounding the scope and 
meaning of the term ‘peoples’, and the associated rights, as enshrined in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)19, which was unclear at the 
                                                 
14 F. Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, Oxford University Press (2007), at 277. 
15 D. L. Hodgson, Becoming Indigenous in Africa, 52 African Studies Review (2009) 1-32, at 8. 
16 Assembly of African Union, Decision on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 8th Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.141 (VIII), 30 January 2007. 
17 F. Viljoen, supra note 14 at 280-281. 
18  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Communities in Africa – Resolution No. 51, 6 November 2000. 
19 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982), adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 Oct 1986. For a list of peoples’ rights see Articles 
19-24. 
7 
time of drafting.20 In the Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of 
Experts on Indigenous Population/Communities (African Commission Report) the 
African Working Group echoed this sentiment, taking the view that the lack of a 
definition for ‘peoples’ leaves open the possibility that the collective rights, 
formulated as peoples’ rights, should be available to sections of populations within 
nation-states, including indigenous peoples and communities.21 
Evolving jurisprudence concerning the meaning of ‘peoples’ seemed to 
support the position advanced by the African Working Group with the Social and 
Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. 
Nigeria (Ogoni)22 being the most relevant case to inform the debate on indigenous 
peoples. The Ogoni case was concerned with the impact of oil development activities 
on the Ogoni people who live in the areas surrounding the Niger delta, where most of 
the oil production was taking place. 23  The African Commission found that the 
Nigerian government, through the Nigerian military and the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company, violated, inter alia, the Ogoni peoples’ rights found in the 
Charter, namely the right of the Ogoni people to freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources.24 The Ogoni decision was pivotal and should not be downplayed in 
the struggle for the recognition of indigenous peoples in Africa even though the 
Ogoni were not explicitly determined to be ‘peoples’, as the decision was the first 
                                                 
20 A. Eide, Rights of Indigenous Peoples – Achievements in International Law During the Last Quarter 
of a Century, 37 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2006) 155-212, at 175-176. 
21  ACHPR, Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities, (1st ed, 2005, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs) at 79. 
22 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria (2001) ACHPR Communication No. 155/96. 
23 G. Pentassuglia, Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights, 22 European 
Journal of International Law (2011) 165-202, at 186. 
24 ibid. 
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time the African Commission recognised a sub-national group as holders of the 
substantive peoples’ rights enshrined in the African Charter.25 
While recognising the existence of indigenous peoples’ rights as analogous to 
peoples’ rights in the African human rights regime, the African Commission Report 
also stressed that: if emphasis remains on early definitions that were intertwined with 
colonisation, the African continent will be left without a suitable concept for 
“analysing internal structural relationships of inequality that have persisted after 
liberation from colonial dominance.”26 Instead the African Working Group suggested 
the following elements for determining ‘indigenousness’ in Africa: self-identification; 
special attachment to and use of their traditional land whereby their ancestral land and 
territory has a fundamental importance for their collective physical and cultural 
survival as peoples; and, experiences of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, 
exclusion or discrimination because these peoples have different cultures, ways of life 
or modes of production than the national hegemonic and dominant model.27 
Moreover, the Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Advisory Opinion) published in 2007, reproduces the above-mentioned 
characteristics adding that “a definition is not necessary or useful as there is no 
universally agreed definition of the term and no single definition can capture the 
characteristics of indigenous populations.” 28  Indigenous peoples is therefore a 
                                                 
25 G. Lynch, Becoming Indigenous in the Pursuit of Justice: The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the Endorois, 111 African Affairs (2011) 24-45, at 37. 
26 ACHPR, supra note 21 at 93 
27 ibid, at 93-94. 
28 ACHPR, Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41st Ordinary Session (adopted May 2007 ) 
available at: <http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0460_ACHPR_Advisory_Op-
UNDRIP_UK_2010.pdf> (last accessed 23 April 2016) at 30. 
9 
“relational, legal concept…and a concept that is contingent historically and 
situationally, and not capable of being captured within one nomothetic definition.”29 
 
B. The Endorois decision: Determining indigenousness 
In the Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority Rights Group 
International (on behalf of the Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya (Endorois)30 the 
African Commission was given its first opportunity to apply its evolving views on 
‘indigenousness’ in Africa. 
The Endorois are a distinct Kalenjin speaking community, who, for centuries, 
have been the traditional inhabitants of the Lake Bogoria area within the Rift Valley 
province in Kenya.31 The Endorois’ traditional way of life has always consisted of 
allowing their animals to graze in the lowlands surrounding Lake Bogoria during the 
rainy season and retreating to the Mochongoi forest for the dry season.32 The green 
pastures around Lake Bogoria have been vital for the health of their livestock and the 
lake also remains important for religious and traditional practices of the Endorois 
community.33 
The Endorois community continued to hold, use and enjoy this land until 1973 
when, without prior consultation or consent, the land was declared a protected area.34 
In 1986, the Endorois community was evicted from the fertile lowlands surrounding 
Lake Bogoria and displaced to semi-arid land, resulting in the death of a number of 
                                                 
29 M. Guenther, The Concept of Indigeneity, 14 Social Anthropology (2006) 17-19, at 17. 
30 The Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority Rights Group International (on behalf of 
the Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya [2010] ACPHR Communication 276/2003. 
31 For a summary of the Endorois community see ibid, at paras 3-21. See also C. Morel, Defending 
Human Rights in Africa: The Case for Minority and Indigenous Rights, 1 Essex Human Rights Review 
(2004) 54-65.  
32 C. Morel, Defending Human Rights in Africa: The Case for Minority and Indigenous Rights, 1 Essex 
Human Rights Review (2004) 54-65, at 56. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
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their animals and their fall into economic hardships previously unknown to them.35 
Moreover, access to Lake Bogoria for religious and cultural purposes was restricted 
and even met with intimidation.36 
In an effort to regain access to their lands, the Endorois community pursued 
various avenues of recourse through the domestic legal system but ultimately failed.37 
The Endorois community first launched their campaign by challenging the land and 
natural resource regime that was adopted, unchanged, from the British colonial 
powers. 38  Following this the Endorois community submitted a complaint to the 
Kenyan High Court, challenging the legality of the forced evictions and the 
constitutionality of the denial of access to their grazing lands, and to their cultural and 
religious sites.39 The Kenya High Court dismissed the Endorois claim and stated very 
clearly that it “could not address the issue of a community’s collective right to 
property” nor did they believe that Kenyan law should afford “any special protection 
to a peoples’ land based on historical occupation and cultural rights.”40  
After exhausting all domestic remedies, the Endorois community, with the 
assistance of two NGOs, Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority 
Rights Group International, filed an individual communication with the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2003 claiming that the Republic of 
Kenya violated their right to practice religion, their right to property, their right to 
culture, their right to free disposition of natural resources, and their right to 
development. 
                                                 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 J. Shepherd and K. Sing’Oei, In Land We Trust: The Endorois Communication and the Quest for 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Africa, 16 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review (2010) 57-111, at 61. 
39 ibid at 62-63. 
40 Endorois, supra note 30, at para. 12. 
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The first substantive aspect the African Commission had to analyse was the 
Endorois’ claim to indigenous identity.41 From the outset, the African Commission 
noted that “the terms ‘peoples’ and ‘indigenous community’ arouse emotive 
debates” 42  and that “there is no universal and unambiguous definition of the 
concept[s].”43 According to the African Commission, using the term ‘indigenous’ is 
not meant to create a special class of citizen but is linked to the notion of ‘peoples’. 
This, in turn, is closely related to collective rights, a concept that can be used to 
address the historical and present day injustices and inequalities felt by sections of 
populations with nation-states.44 By allowing for a section of a population to claim 
protection when their rights as a collective are being violated, as was done in the 
Ogoni case, the African Commission opened the door for indigenous peoples to claim 
similar protection. 
Moreover, since the Charter includes provisions for peoples to retain rights as 
peoples, and indigenous communities do fall within this parameter, the African 
Commission then set out to provide criteria that could be used for identifying 
indigenous peoples. For this, the African Commission referred to the work done by 
the African Working Group, which highlighted the following criteria and shared 
characteristics: occupation and use of a specific territory; the voluntary perpetuation 
of cultural distinctiveness; self-identification as a distinct collectivity; recognition by 
other groups; an experience of subjugation, marginalisation, exclusion or 
discrimination; and, survival of their particular way of life which was dependent on 
access and rights to their traditional land and the natural resources thereon.45 
                                                 
41  J. Murphy “Extending Indigenous Rights By Way of the African Charter” (2012) 24 Pace 
International Law Review 158-189, at 176. 
42 Endorois, supra note 30, at para. 148. 
43 ibid, at para. 147. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid, at para. 150. 
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Furthermore, in attempting to dispel Kenya’s argument that Endorois are not a 
distinct community but a mere Kalejin-speaking sub-group of the Tugen tribe, the 
African Commission turned to the concept of self-identification included in the 
above-mentioned definitions.46 To do this, the African Commission relied heavily on 
jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR or Inter-
American Court), most notably Saramaka People v. Suriname (Saramaka). 47  The 
Saramaka case dealt with one of six distinct Maroon groups living in Suriname, an 
Afro-descendant community whose ancestors were African slaves forcibly taken to 
Suriname during European colonisation in the 17th century.48 Although not fitting the 
narrow aboriginal, pre-Colombian conception of an indigenous community, the 
Saramaka still claimed violations to their collective rights, most notably to property 
because, over time, the Saramaka developed an ancestral link to their land and their 
way of life depended heavily on the traditional use of their land.49 In view of the 
evidence presented, the Inter-American Court considered that the Saramaka people 
made up a tribal community distinct from other sections of the population and that 
they had a special relationship with their ancestral land.50 The Inter-American Court 
decided this despite some of the members of the Saramaka community not 
“occupy[ing] the same precise history, territory, or customs of the larger super-class 
of which they were a part.”51 Noting the similarities to the claims of the Saramaka 
people and the Endorois, along with the Endorois’ strong linkages between history, 
traditions, land and culture, fulfilling much of the criteria of the above-mentioned 
definitions, the African Commission determined that the Endorois community was an 
                                                 
46 ibid, at para. 145 and paras. 157-162. 
47 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname (2007), Series C No. 172, Judgment of 28 November 2007. 
48 Endorois, supra note 30, at para. 160. 
49 ibid, at para.158. 
50 ibid, at para. 160. 
51 J. Murphy, supra note 41, at 177. 
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indigenous community and thus able to benefit from the provisions of the Charter that 
protect collective rights.52  
In supplementing previous African Commission jurisprudence concerning 
collective rights, and the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities interpretations, with international ‘soft’ law 
sources and comparative jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court, the African 
Commission adopted an expansive definition of indigeneity, and one that will 
hopefully have lasting positive consequences.53 
 
III. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
A. Self-determination in international law  
The right to self-determination crystallised as a rule of customary international 
law throughout the 1950s and the 1960s when the United Nations General Assembly 
passed a number of landmark resolutions announcing the decolonisation era. 54 
Following this, the UN systematically referred to self-determination in its practice and 
also confirmed its view in the Friendly Relations Declaration of 27 October 1970.55  
From the practice of the General Assembly and the way States were reacting, a sort of 
consensus quickly emerged that peoples living under colonial rule, those living under 
(foreign or military) occupation, as well as under a racist regime, such as the white 
minority and apartheid regimes in Southern Africa, have a right to self-determination. 
Self-determination was interpreted as a right to decide upon the international political 
                                                 
52 Endorois, supra note 30, at para. 162. 
53 J. Murphy, supra note 41, at 177. 
54 See United Nations General Assembly, U.N.G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 December 1960 and UNGA 
Res. 1541 (XV), 15 December 1960.  
55 United Nations General Assembly, U.N.G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. 
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status of the territory in which the people live. 56  This external form of self-
determination has in practice mainly been implemented in the form of independence. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has on various occasions had the opportunity 
to confirm the legal value of this interpretation of self-determination.57  
Whether beyond the ‘colonial’ exercise of self-determination or not, other 
forms of self-determination, consolidated as rules under international law, were for a 
long time a more controversial issue. In 1974, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as its counterpart, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), entered into force58 and covenants 
used the same wording in their first article in referring to a peoples’ right to self-
determination. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), charged with providing 
authoritative interpretations of the norms contained in the ICCPR, interpreted Article 
1 as the peoples’ right to participate in the decision-making process of the State59 and 
following this the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
                                                 
56 For a discussion on that aspect of self-determination See M. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law 
and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1982), at 48-62; 
H. A. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, Clarendon 
Press (1988); A. R. Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A Study of United 
Nations Practice, A.W. Sijthoff (1973), at 324-351; I. M. Rafiqual, Use of Force in Self-Determination 
Claims,  25 Indian Journal of International Law (1985) 424-447. 
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of America] (1986) I.C.J. Reports; Case concerning East Timor [Portugal v. Australia] (1995) I.C.J. 
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3, 6 I.L.M. 360, 16 December 1966. 
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Discrimination (CERD) took a similar position.60 This interpretation has been termed 
internal self-determination by international doctrine.61 It took some time for all States 
to follow the interpretation provided by Committees such as the HRC and CERD but 
today a general consensus exists on this complementary view of self-determination. 
Contrary to the colonial variant of self-determination, this latter form has to be 
exercised within the confines of existing States because the principle of territorial 
integrity considerably limits demands for self-determination leading to the break-up 
of existing States. Secession has therefore been rejected as a legal mode to exercise 
self-determination even in situations of (extreme) oppression by the State. In this 
context, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) stated in its opinion on the ex-
hypothesis unilateral secession of Quebec from Canada that beyond the exercise of 
self-determination in the context of colonialism, foreign domination, occupation and 
exploitation, “it remains unclear whether it reflects an international law standard”62 
that in a situation “when a people is blocked from meaningful exercise of its rights to 
self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by 
                                                 
60  In its General Recommendation 21 CERD stated that: “In respect of the self-determination of 
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16 
secession”.63 Reactions to secessionist claims have shown that if it is not based on a 
sort of agreement between the seceding part and the State it formally belonged to, as 
was the case with Eritrea and South Sudan, States have a certain tendency to 
recognise the de facto situation.64 One can therefore understand why in the absence of 
a clear pronouncement of the issue in primary international law sources, legal doctrine 
tends to agree that international law remains neutral on the question of secession.65  
 
B. The UNDRIP and self-determination 
With the adoption of the UNDRIP the fragile consensus on self-determination that 
was reached in the aftermath of the decolonisation period came under pressure. As 
mentioned earlier, one of the most controversial issues in the drafting of the 
Declaration was whether indigenous peoples possess a right to self-determination. 
The Declaration, pushed by the indigenous peoples’ movement which maintained to 
not be satisfied with anything less than an unconditional reference to self-
determination but at the same time appeasing the fears of States by emphasising that 
they were not seeking for a right to secession, opted for an unambiguous reference to 
self-determination. The Preamble of the Declaration shows that the indigenous 
peoples got what they were seeking on that point. Moreover, Article 3 insists on the 
right to self-determination in a language similar to that used in common Article 1 of 
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the above-mentioned ICCPR and the ICESCR as it stipulates that by virtue of the right 
to self-determination indigenous peoples have the right to “freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. However, read 
together with Articles 4 and 5 of the Declaration, a more specific view on the 
meaning and content of indigenous self-determination can be teased out: 
 
Article 4  
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well 
as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
 
Article 5  
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, 
if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. 
    Thus, the exercise of self-determination is focused on both indigenous “autonomous governance and participatory engagement” in the decision-making processes that affect them.66 In this regard, the Declaration clearly adds a new 
dimension to the traditional view on self-determination. Though autonomy or self-
government are generally not considered terms of art in existing international law67 
and are rather concepts confined to domestic constitutional law, one has to approach 
the reference to self-determination through these concepts. Under the Declaration 
indigenous communities now have the right to govern their most essential matters 
autonomously.68  By emphasising autonomy, indigenous self-determination becomes 
a means to redress past marginalisation in order to be able to fully exist and develop 
as a distinct group. Thus by confirming that the States’ population could be 
constituted by more than one people for the purpose of self-determination, and that 
                                                 
66 J. Anaya, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era’ in C. 
Charters, R. Stavenhagen (eds) Making Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGA 2009), at 193. 
67 H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press (1992), at 4. 
68 Article 4 of the UNDRIP. 
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autonomy for these distinct peoples became a fully-fledged right under international 
law, the Declaration undoubtedly questions the fragile consensus observed in the 
post-colonisation era.  
 
C. African and indigenous self-determination 
It has been explained above that at the end of the UNDRIP drafting process 
African States were among the most vocal to protest against a reading of self-
determination, which they considered a dangerous precedent. Africa always had an 
ambiguous relationship with self-determination. On the one hand it strongly defended 
a right to independence in a colonial context but on the other hand categorically 
rejected every move towards an interpretation of the right that could lead to the 
dismemberment of the States created by the decolonisation process. An expansive 
interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity and the concept of intangibility of 
frontiers were meant to protect the acquis inherited from colonialism.69  
In 2006, when the draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples had 
successfully passed the hurdle of the Human Rights Council and had been transmitted 
to the General Assembly for its final consideration and adoption, African States, 
supported by the African Union (AU), pushed hard to defer the adoption of the 
Declaration stating that Africa’s interests and concerns were not sufficiently taken 
into account in the text of the Declaration.70 As mentioned earlier, the concerns of the 
African Group of States and the African Union inter alia focused on the reference to 
self-determination including its novel interpretation and the destabilising effect the 
                                                 
69 See Organisation of African Unity, Charter of the Organization of African Unity (1963) at Article II 
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right could have on national and territorial integrity.71 To help frame its position the 
AU requested an Advisory Opinion on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
The African Commission and its Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities had, however, been developing a more progressive stance 
vis-à-vis the rights of indigenous peoples on the continent 72 but that had largely 
remained unnoticed by the African States and their regional organisation, the African 
Union. 73 Not surprisingly therefore, the Advisory Opinion referred to the African 
Commission’s previous report on indigenous peoples and argued that the rights 
recognised in the draft UN Declaration, correspond to a great extent to human rights 
standards already existing on the African continent. With regards to the right of self-
determination, the Advisory Opinion stated that: 
Article 46 of the Declaration […] is in conformity with the African Commission’s 
jurisprudence on the promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous populations 
based on respect of sovereignty, the inviolability of the borders acquired at independence 
of the member states and respect for their territorial integrity… the notion of self-
determination has evolved with the development of the international visibility of the 
claims made by indigenous populations whose right to self-determination is exercised 
within the standards and according to the modalities which are compatible with the 
territorial integrity of the Nation States to which they belong. 74 
 
Thus, for the African Commission indigenous peoples’ self-determination was far 
from a revolutionary question as long as it was exercised within the limits of 
territorial integrity. In doing so, the Advisory Opinion of the African Commission 
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certainly contributed to unlocking the reluctance of the African States resulting in  the 
UNDRIP being adopted a year later with an overwhelming majority.75  
In its practice the African Commission has also increasingly drawn attention 
to issues regarding indigenous peoples in both the State reporting procedure76 as well 
as in the individual communication procedure. However, a clear position has not yet 
been taken with regard to the right of self-determination of indigenous peoples. In a 
few cases the African Commission had nevertheless the possibility to dwell on the 
collective rights recognised in the African Charter. The African Commission had for 
long remained very cautious when addressing self-determination demands especially 
if one takes into account that Article 20 of the African Charter explicitly recognises 
the right to self-determination. One could nevertheless perceive a greater openness 
towards accepting an indigenous right to self-determination. In Katangese Peoples’ 
Congress v. Zaire, the African Commission was asked to give its view on a complaint 
alleging that the people of Katanga who live across Zambia and Zaire (now 
Democratic Republic of the Congo) were entitled to an independent and separate 
State for its history proved that its territory is distinct from Zaire and that members of 
the Katangese people living in Zambia faced difficulties with immigration authorities 
in Zambia. The African Commission first declared the complaint admissible but 
finally found it without merit under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. In the succinct statement of law of the communication there seems to be an 
opening under certain conditions of grave violations of human rights to consider 
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peoples within the State (not the whole people of the State) as distinct peoples for the 
purpose of self-determination on the condition that the exercise of such right does not 
conflict with the principle of territorial integrity.77 During discussions in the African 
Commission, the majority found that it was not its task to “redraw the boundaries of 
African States” and that it would be inconsistent with the basic principles of the 
Organisation of African Unity to entertain the complaint.78  
In the Ogoni case, the African Commission was much more favourable 
towards indigenous self-determination. It found that the killings and destruction by 
Nigerian governmental forces and agents of the State-controlled oil company in 
Ogoniland had violated the right to life and dignity, the right to health, the right to 
property, the rights to shelter and food, and the right to economic, social and cultural 
development of the Ogoni.79 Although the case was not explicitly approached as an 
indigenous peoples’ question, the case nevertheless seems relevant for indigenous 
peoples for two main reasons. First, the communication has largely inspired the 
Working Group when they embarked on a process to describe indigenous peoples’ 
rights.80 Second, it has also paved the way for the development of a more significant 
implementation of indigenous rights in Africa. With the Ogoni decision the African 
Commission opened a door to a progressive interpretation of the beneficiaries of 
peoples’ rights. Despite the non-expressed recognition of the Ogoni community as an 
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indigenous people, the decision seemed to imply that the Ogoni were a ‘people’81 as 
the African Commission accepted approaching the rights of the Ogoni people 
collectively. In addition, the African Commission argued that “the African Charter in 
Articles 20 through 24 clearly provide for peoples to retain rights as peoples, that is, 
as collectives” and that “the importance of community and collective identity in 
African culture is recognised throughout the African Charter.”82 Thus, it could be 
implicitly inferred from the decision that the provisions on people’s rights (including 
the right to self-determination) were applicable to minorities and also to indigenous 
peoples. 83 With the Ogoni case one still has to wait for the first case to address 
indigenous peoples' rights from the point of view of self-determination. The landmark 
Endorois case on indigenous peoples addressed various issues of prime importance 
for indigenous peoples in Africa but not the question of self-determination.    
While one could have thought, on the basis of the African position in the UN 
prior to the adoption of the UNDRIP, that the African human rights practice with 
regard to self-determination would be radically different from the standard 
proclaimed by the UNDRIP, everything indicates that the legal stand taken by the 
African Commission is quite close to what the Declaration provides. 
 
IV. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 
The right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) has been highlighted by 
indigenous peoples as a fundamental component of their right to self-determination. 
As a representative of the Indigenous Global Caucus has stated:  “free, prior and 
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conformed consent is what we demand as part of self-determination and non-
discrimination from governments, multinationals and private actors.”84  
While the principle is at the heart of indigenous peoples’ claims, its 
recognition as a component of the UNDRIP was not achieved without difficulty. In 
2006, when the African Group tabled its Draft Memoire to prolong consultation over 
the UNDRIP, they raised the concern that “free, prior and informed consent 
(UNDRIP, Article 19) could be interpreted to confer upon a sub-national group a 
power of veto over the laws of a democratic legislature.”85 The African States pressed 
for an explicit confirmation that this was not the objective intended by the UN 
Declaration.86 Central to the concerns of African States was the fear that indigenous 
peoples could interfere with development policies and State control over lands and 
natural resources, thereby affecting national interests. In response to the Africa 
Group’s concerns, the African Commission pointed out that in practice consultation 
with indigenous peoples on certain laws and policies does translate into bestowing 
upon indigenous peoples the power of a veto over legislative process. 87  In fact, 
Article 19 of the UNDRIP simply reaffirms the right of peoples to participate 
effectively in the public affairs of their States, a right that is already recognised by all 
African constitutions and the African Charter.88 While acknowledging the state of 
exclusion and marginalisation suffered by most indigenous communities in Africa, the 
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African Commission indicated that the use of FPIC in the Declaration “[is] aimed at 
preventing, respectively, a situation of fait accompli, or forced consent or of an 
agreement based on the ignorance of the indigenous communities concerned.” 89 
Therefore, in the view of the African Commission, FPIC constitutes a mechanism to 
redress the power imbalance between indigenous peoples and States, a means to 
guarantee that indigenous peoples were not treated in a discriminatory manner or 
unequally vis-à-vis other peoples. 90 Moreover, in order to protect the interests of 
indigenous communities, the African Commission highlighted the importance of 
consent. In its Advisory Opinion, it insisted on both the substantive and procedural 
aspects of the term to protect indigenous interests against the invasive effects of 
certain development projects. According to the African Commission:  
The term ‘consent’ means that indigenous peoples must be involved in all aspects of 
planning, from beginning to end, and that there must be consultation at all stages. 
Indigenous peoples must be consulted and their participation must be continuous. 
Consent must be informed in terms of the nature, size, scope, duration, location, 
impact, reasons, purpose and specific procedures for the intended development 
project. Indigenous communities need to have an exact view of the project before it is 
adopted.91 
 
Without further specifying whether FPIC implied an unqualified right to veto, the 
African Commission concluded by emphasising that FPIC “must be understood as a 
guiding principle for an effective dialogue between indigenous communities and 
States, within a context of partnership and mutual respect.” 92  Ultimately, it also 
“recommends that African States should promote an African common position that 
will inform the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples with 
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this African perspective so as to consolidate the overall consensus achieved by the 
international community on the issue”93  
Prior to the adoption of the UNDRIP, the principle of FPIC had already been 
recognised by several human rights bodies but there was no broad agreement on the 
meaning of the term. In its General Recommendation 23 on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) exhorts 
States to “ensure that members of indigenous peoples have rights in respect of 
effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their 
rights and interests are taken without their informed consent.” 94  In turn, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has also stated several 
times the need to obtain indigenous consent in relation to development projects and 
natural resources extraction.95 In 2004, the CESCR emphasised that it was “deeply 
concerned that natural extraction concessions have been granted to international 
companies without the full consent of the concerned communities.”96 Subsequently 
the CESCR called upon States to ensure the participation of indigenous peoples in 
decisions affecting their lives and particularly urged it “to consult and seek the 
consent of the indigenous peoples concerned prior to the implementation of 
development projects and on any public policy affecting them.”97  
The issue of FPIC has also been addressed on several occasions in relation to 
ILO Convention 169. 98  As a general principle, ILO Convention 169 states that 
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consultations between indigenous peoples and governments “shall be undertaken, in 
good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of 
achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.” 99  Article 6 provides 
general guidelines on how to conduct consultations, stipulating that consultation with 
indigenous peoples should be undertaken through their representative institutions, by 
means of which they can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors 
of the population, at all levels of decision-making.100 In Article 7, ILO Convention 
169 further recognises indigenous peoples’ right “to decide their own priorities for the 
process of development’ and ‘to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their 
own economic, social and cultural development.”101 In Articles 2, 5 and 15, the ILO 
Convention 169 requires that States fully consult with indigenous peoples and ensure 
their informed participation in the context of development, national institutions and 
programmes, and the management of lands and resources.102 In addition, Article 16 
requires States to obtain FPIC where the relocation of indigenous communities or the 
removal from their lands is foreseen by the government.103  
The most recent articulation of FPIC is contained in the UNDRIP. In several 
provisions, the Declaration calls explicitly for clear consultation and participation 
rights and further establishes the purpose of FPIC. In the context of relocation, 
Articles 10, 11 and 28 of the UNDRIP prohibit the forcible removal of indigenous 
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peoples from their lands, as well as the confiscation of their lands, without the free, 
prior, and informed consent of the communities concerned. 104  Similarly, the 
Declaration stipulates in Article 29 that it is the duty of States to ensure that no 
storage or disposal of hazardous material is undertaken on the lands and territories of 
indigenous communities without their FPIC.105 Furthermore, in Articles 19 and 32(2), 
it requires States to consult and cooperate in good faith with indigenous peoples in 
order to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent before adopting or 
implementing legislative measures or projects that may affect them.106  
Although the requirement of FPIC is fairly well articulated in the UNDRIP, 
the adoption of the UNDRIP has not solved all controversy over its meaning. In 
particular, the expression “consult to obtain the free prior and informed consent” used 
in Article 32 leaves a great deal of ambiguity as to whether the requirement to obtain 
FPIC gives indigenous peoples an unqualified right to block development projects 
desired by the government.107 While surveying the drafting process of the UNDRIP, it 
is possible to argue that this is not the case. 108  Originally, Article 32 explicitly 
recognised the right of veto of indigenous peoples. However, as a result of the 
contestation of numerous States, including African governments, this interpretation 
was not retained in the final provision.109 Therefore, one can deduce that FPIC cannot 
be interpreted as conferring upon indigenous communities an unqualified right to 
veto. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the UNDRIP only recognises the right to 
consultation and participation of indigenous peoples: had this been the case, the final 
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instrument would have endorsed the expression “States shall seek to obtain the 
consent of indigenous peoples”, instead of the much more stringent expression “in 
order to obtain consent” which was ultimately included in the Declaration.110 On the 
basis of this reading, one can arguably conclude that the requirement of FPIC does not 
bestow an outright veto by indigenous peoples but rather it confers upon them the 
right to block legislation and projects in specific cases.111 Moreover, this is the view 
defended by the African Commission.112 
Recently, the principle of FPIC has been enshrined in the jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American and African human rights systems. In 2006, the Inter-American Court 
was the first to endorse the principle as a basis to protect the property interests of the 
Saramaka, a community from Suriname, against the development project desired by 
the government on Saramaka lands. 113 As a general principle, the Inter-American 
Court established in its landmark decision the duty of State to consult with the 
concerned communities in relation to development or investment plans launched 
within its territory.114 More precisely, the Inter-American Court required States to 
disseminate information and to consult the community in good faith through 
culturally appropriate procedures with the objective of reaching an agreement. 115 
Interestingly, in its decision, the Inter-American Court made a significant distinction 
between small and large-scale development projects. 116  Whereas for small 
development projects the government has the duty to consult the community with the 
objective to achieve consent, in the case of large-scale development or investment 
projects that would have a major impact within indigenous territory, the State has a 
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duty, not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain their free, prior, and 
informed consent, according to their customs and traditions. 117  From a general 
perspective, this view is in line with the above interpretation of the UNDRIP 
establishing the right of indigenous peoples to consultation as a general rule and a 
right to consent to decisions that impact upon their livelihoods in specific 
circumstances.118  
The African Commission reached a similar conclusion in the Endorois case. In 
their application, the Endorois community members stated that they were not fully 
and accurately informed of the nature and consequences of the project nor were they 
provided with an effective opportunity to participate individually or collectively in the 
consultation process.119 They further argued that the government violated their right 
to development by engaging in coercive and intimidating activity that had abrogated 
the community's right to meaningful participation and freely given consent.120 In its 
landmark decision, the African Commission found that Kenya had violated the 
community’s rights to land property, natural resources, development and their cultural 
rights. 
The requirement of consultation and prior and informed consent played an 
instrumental role in the African Commission's argument.121 It first helped to establish 
a violation of the property rights of the Endorois community and then assisted in 
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finding a violation of the right to development. Concerning property rights, the first 
task of the African Commission was to establish that the Endorois’ traditional lands 
surrounding Lake Bogoria constitute property under the African Charter.122 Having 
done so, the African Commission subsequently examined whether the State had failed 
to protect the Endorois’ property rights. In its analysis, the African Commission noted 
that a limitation on the property rights of indigenous peoples cannot be in accordance 
with the law when the law does not give rise to the right of consultation and 
compensation of the indigenous community concerned.123 The African Commission 
emphasised that “in terms of consultation, the threshold is especially stringent in 
favour of indigenous peoples, as it also requires that consent be accorded. Failure to 
observe the obligations to consult and to seek consent – or to compensate - ultimately 
result in a violation of the right to property.” 124  Setting aside this awkward 
formulation, as the African Commission’s statement leaves doubts as to whether it 
confers upon States the duty to seek or to obtain consent of the community, the 
African Commission subsequently elaborated on the requirements to guarantee the 
property rights of indigenous peoples which were borrowed directly from the 
Saramaka decision.125 The African Commission stated that in order to guarantee that 
the restriction on property rights do not amount to a denial of indigenous survival, the 
State must first ensure the effective participation of the members of the community, in 
conformity with their customs and traditions, regarding any development, investment, 
exploration or extraction plan within their territory.126 Then, it must guarantee that the 
community will receive a reasonable benefit from any such plan within their territory 
and ensure that no concession will be issued unless independent and technically 
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capable entities, with the State’s supervision, perform a prior environmental and 
social impact assessment.127 In the light of the testimony of the Endorois, the African 
Commission expressed the view that no effective participation had been allowed for 
the community.128 It also underlined the absence of prior environmental and impact 
assessments in the decision making process and finally concluded on the violation of 
Article 14, the right to property under the African Charter.129  
From the African Commission’s perspective, the issues of participation and 
consultation are not only fundamental to the protection of the right to property but it is 
also linked to the right to development. 130 As a general rule, the decision clearly 
established the duty of governments to consult indigenous peoples, especially when 
dealing with sensitive issues such as land. 131 However, it is not only enough for 
governments to conduct consultation with the communities concerned in relation to 
development projects conducted on their territories. The African Commission 
stipulated that consultation must also be held according to indigenous customs, in 
good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures and with the objective of 
reaching an agreement. 132  With the failure of the government to consult the 
representative body of the Endorois, and with the authorities selecting particular 
individuals to lend their consent ‘on behalf’ of the community, it was felt that this 
could not result in either fair or legitimate consultation.133 In order to be culturally 
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appropriate, consultation must be conducted with the ‘true’ representatives of the 
community, according to their own traditions. 
Subsequently, the African Commission took the view that “the State has a 
duty not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain their free, prior, and 
informed consent, according to their customs and traditions.”134 In this regard, the 
African Commission indicated that the government of Kenya “did not obtain the 
prior, informed consent of all the Endorois before designating their land as a Game 
Reserve and commencing their eviction”. 135  Given the illiteracy and the lack of 
understanding of the Endorois community about the consequences of the project, the 
African Commission noted that the community could not have been accurately 
informed: to have a process of consent that is fully informed “requires at a minimum 
that all of the members of the community are fully and accurately informed of the 
nature and consequences of the process and provided with an effective opportunity to 
participate individually or as collectives.” 136  As a result, it was the African 
Commission's belief “that the inadequacy of the consultations left the Endorois 
feeling disenfranchised from a process of utmost importance to their life as a 
people.”137 Ultimately the African Commission also agreed “that if consultations had 
been conducted in a manner that effectively involved the Endorois, there would have 
been no ensuing confusion as to their rights or resentment that their consent had been 
wrongfully gained.” 138  To that end, the African Commission finally reached the 
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conclusion that the government of Kenya violated the Endorois community’s right to 
development.139  
From the perspective of international human rights, the endorsement of the 
principle of FPIC by the African Commission in the Endorois decision represents a 
significant contribution to the development of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
Notwithstanding its heavy reliance on the reasoning of the Inter-American Court, the 
African Commission helped to reinforce the importance of participation and 
consultation of indigenous peoples in decision making processes that affect them. 
Although it is too early to draw conclusions on the exact scope and meaning of the 
principle of FPIC, the African Commission has contributed to bolstering the 
importance of this principle as a safeguard for protecting the interests of indigenous 
peoples. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The African Charter is the only regional human rights instrument to endorse 
the protection of peoples’ rights, to recognise the right to self-determination and the 
right to development.  Most African governments have, however, been reluctant to 
recognise indigenous peoples as beneficiaries of those rights. They expressed concern 
over what the implication that the exercise of these rights could represent for the 
stability and territorial integrity of African States if granted to indigenous peoples. 
Some authorities even questioned the existence of indigenous peoples within African 
borders. On the global stage, the position of African States on the issues of indigenous 
peoples’ rights provoked a delay in the adoption process of the UNDRIP. Fortunately, 
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the views of the African Commission were able to subdue the fears raised by the 
group of African States so that the Declaration could be adopted.  
The engagement of the African Commission in the development of indigenous 
peoples’ rights as a specific issue of African human rights law predated the political 
deadlock caused by the deferral of the adoption of the UNDRIP at the UN. Yet, the 
views of the African Commission were unknown to many African States until the 
issue reached the UN General Assembly in 2006.140 With its Advisory Opinion, the 
African Commission convincingly argued that the way the rights of indigenous 
peoples were framed in the UNDRIP did not represent a threat to African States. In 
addition, the African Commission managed to successfully offer an ‘African 
perspective’ on the rights of indigenous peoples, developing its own concept of 
indigenousness that focused on ‘marginalisation and exclusion’ instead of the much 
contested criterion of ‘priority’ to define who indigenous peoples are in Africa. In 
doing so, the African Commission was able to bypass the controversy whether 
indigenous peoples are, as a concept, relevant in an African context. Moreover, its 
stance has also broadened the scope of application of indigenous peoples’ rights 
beyond the colonial framework and this will undoubtedly have repercussions in other 
parts of the world where the existence of indigenous peoples has not been fully 
accepted. 141  
Furthermore, the contribution of the African Commission was not simply 
limited to the adoption of the UNDRIP. By developing a novel interpretation of the 
African Charter, recognising that indigenous groups are the rights holders of peoples’ 
rights protected by the Charter, the African Commission determined that indigenous 
peoples are entitled to enjoy the same human rights as other ‘peoples’. Through its 
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careful reasoning the African Commission was able to set aside most uncertainties 
concerning the application of self-determination to the situation of indigenous 
peoples, as we saw in the Ogoni and Katanga cases, while endorsing an interpretation 
of self-determination that no longer defines the right in terms of secession and 
independent statehood, confirming that the right can be exercised within States 
borders, thereby dismissing arguments that would limit indigenous self-determination 
on the basis that its exercise represents a threat to the territorial integrity of States.  
In the landmark Endorois decision, the African Commission managed to  clear 
all doubts concerning the possibility of indigenous peoples claiming the collective 
benefits of the right to property, natural resources and development as protected under 
the African Charter. Although it is too early to draw conclusions on the impact of its 
jurisprudence, this decision is a major step forward in favour of indigenous peoples’ 
rights in Africa. Moreover, its focus on the collective rights of indigenous peoples to 
consultation and participation and its emphasis on the requirement of FPIC reinforces 
the recognition of the distinctive interests of indigenous peoples in the development 
process of their countries. Given the increasing pressures on indigenous lands and the 
threat development projects cause to their livelihoods, the recognition of those rights 
is paramount to the survival of indigenous peoples. Together with the Inter-American 
Court, the African Commission has taken a favourable move to defend the interests of 
indigenous peoples and to remedy their longstanding exclusion and marginalisation 
from the development process of their states.  
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the work of the African Commission will 
lead to significant changes locally. 
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